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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
Amici are law professors (listed in Addendum A) who have taught, studied, 
written about, and have expertise in the Constitution, constitutional history, and the 
structure and requisites of American federalism.1  They take no position on the 
wisdom of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the “Act”), Pub. L. No. 
111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.), a question on which their views diverge.  Nonetheless, they 
have a profound interest in and expertise on a legal issue this Court is asked to 
decide—whether the Act is within Congress’s powers.  On that question they are 
of one mind:  The provision is plainly constitutional. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Amici do not address whether plaintiffs have standing.  Amici offer this brief 
to assist the Court in the event it addresses the merits of plaintiffs’ constitutional 
challenge—specifically, whether the Act’s minimum-coverage provision is a valid 
exercise of Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and 
Proper Clause. 
____________________________ 
1 Pursuant to F.R.A.P. 29(c)(5), amici certify that no party’s counsel authored this 
brief in whole or in part, that no counsel or party contributed money intended to 
fund the preparation or submission of this brief, and that no person other than 
amici and their counsel made such a monetary contribution.  The parties 
(defendants, Lieutenant Governor Kinder, and Ms. Hill) have consented to the 
filing of this brief. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Having experienced the inadequacy of the Articles of Confederation, the 
Constitution’s Framers understood that the national government needed authority 
“to legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union, and also in those to 
which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United 
States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation.”  2 Records of 
the Federal Convention 21 (Farrand ed., 1911).  To that end, the Constitution 
granted the national government broad powers, including the power to “regulate 
Commerce . . . among the several States,” U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 3, and enact 
laws “necessary and proper” to the effective exercise of that power, id. art. I, §8, 
cl. 18.   
The federal government has thus long addressed national economic prob-
lems that States could not solve or, worse, would exacerbate.  As the Nation’s 
economy has become increasingly integrated, moreover, Congress’s exercise of its 
commerce power has naturally expanded as well.  Today, it is beyond argument 
that the Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate not merely trade between 
States but also commerce within States that cumulatively has significant interstate 
effects.   
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Perhaps for that reason, plaintiffs do not challenge the validity of the vast 
majority of the Act’s provisions.   They do not argue that Congress exceeded its 
powers by enacting provisions that: 
 Prohibit insurers from denying coverage of preexisting condi-
tions.  42 U.S.C §300gg-3(a). 
 Ban insurers from discriminating or denying eligibility based 
on health status.  Id. §300gg-4(a). 
 Bar insurers from establishing “lifetime limits” or “unreason-
able annual limits” on benefits and claims.  Id. §300gg-
11(a)(1)-(2). 
 Prohibit rescission of insurance contracts.  Id. §300gg-12. 
 Require insurers to provide a simple coverage summary.  Id. 
§300gg-15(b). 
 Require insurers to pay for preventive care.  Id. §300gg-13. 
 Require insurers to cover dependents to age 26.  Id. §300gg-
14(a). 
Any challenge to those provisions would be futile:  The Supreme Court has square-
ly held that Congress’s commerce powers extend to insurance-market regulation.  
See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 539 (1944). 
Plaintiffs instead challenge the Act’s minimum-coverage requirement—the 
so-called “individual mandate.”  Under that provision, most Americans who 
otherwise lack health insurance must, in effect, pay for healthcare in advance by 
obtaining some minimal level of health coverage, instead of purchasing healthcare 
on the spot market (or obtaining healthcare without paying for it) later.  See 26 
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U.S.C. §5000A.  The decisions of millions of Americans to purchase health 
insurance now, or instead take a wait-and-see approach, so profoundly affect 
interstate healthcare and health-insurance markets that Congress’s authority to 
regulate under the Commerce Clause should be beyond doubt.   
The minimum-coverage requirement, moreover, is independently supported 
by the Necessary and Proper Clause.  A central purpose of the Act is to regulate 
interstate commerce—to impose certain terms on health-insurance contracts sold 
across the country to make them more readily available.  No one disputes that such 
direct regulation of health-insurance markets is within Congress’s commerce 
power.  Absent the minimum-coverage requirement, however, many of those regu-
latory efforts would be futile or counterproductive.  For example, a system requir-
ing insurers to cover preexisting conditions cannot endure if individuals do not 
have to maintain insurance when they are healthy:  Too many healthy individuals 
would wait to buy insurance until they become sick, assured that coverage cannot 
be denied.  Insurance markets would become dominated by high-cost, high-risk 
purchasers, with fewer healthy insureds offsetting the costs.  Premiums would sky-
rocket, and cost pressures could drive insurers from the market altogether.   
Congress therefore recognized that the minimum-coverage requirement is 
“essential” to key portions of its regulation of insurance markets.  42 U.S.C. 
§18091(a)(2)(I).  From McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), to 
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United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010), the Necessary and Proper 
Clause has consistently been interpreted to grant Congress broad authority to enact 
legislation appropriate or beneficial to the exercise of its enumerated powers.  The 
minimum-coverage requirement satisfies even the narrowest interpretations of that 
clause.  It is the keystone that prevents much of the Act’s indisputably valid edifice 
of insurance regulation from collapsing. 
ARGUMENT 
In provisions not challenged here, the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act directly regulates commerce by regularizing health-insurance contracts 
and restricting terms like preexisting-condition exclusions and discriminatory 
pricing.  Those regulations, unquestionably within Congress’s Commerce Clause 
authority, would be ineffective absent the minimum-coverage requirement that 
plaintiffs do challenge.  The Necessary and Proper Clause exists to permit Con-
gress to enact precisely such provisions that it reasonably deems necessary and 
appropriate to effectuating its enumerated powers.  The minimum-coverage re-
quirement, moreover, is a permissible regulation of commerce in its own right. 
I. The Commerce Clause Was Designed and Has Been Understood To 
Empower Congress To Address Problems Requiring National Solutions 
Having learned firsthand the disastrous consequences of denying the 
national government authority to address issues of common interest, the Framers 
drafted a Constitution that empowers Congress to legislate for the general interests 
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of the Nation, where the individual States are incompetent to act, and where 
individual state legislation might disrupt national harmony.  Plaintiffs’ position 
harkens not to the original understanding of the Constitution (or to the Supreme 
Court’s cases interpreting it), but to the discredited Articles of Confederation.     
A. The Commerce Clause Was Designed To Afford Congress Broad 
Power Over National Economic Problems 
The Articles of Confederation had left the new Nation adrift in a motley sea 
of competing and conflicting state laws, its central government unable to maintain 
order.  George Washington lamented, “I do not conceive we can exist long as a 
nation, without having lodged some where a power which will pervade the whole 
Union in as energetic a manner, as the authority of the State governments extends 
over the several States.”  Washington, Letters and Addresses 287 (Viles ed., 1909).  
James Madison observed that the Articles had failed because of “[w]ant of concert 
in matters where common interest requires it.”  1 Letters and Other Writings of 
James Madison 321 (1865).  Without a central government capable of establishing 
uniform commercial regulations, States enacted protectionist restrictions on “com-
mercial intercourse with other States,” which in turn “beg[a]t retaliating regu-
lations” that were not merely “expensive and vexatious in themselves” but also 
“destructive of the general harmony.”  Id. 
The absence of a uniform economic policy exacted a heavy toll.  As Alexan-
der Hamilton observed, often “it would be beneficial to all the States to encourage, 
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or suppress[,] a particular branch of trade, while it would be detrimental to [any] to 
attempt it without the concurrence of the rest.”  7 The Papers of Alexander Hamil-
ton 78 (Syrett ed., 1962).  The risk of non-cooperation meant “the experiment 
would probably be left untried” by any State “for fear of a want of that concur-
rence.”  Id.; see also Levy, Federalism and Collective Action, 45 U. Kan. L. Rev. 
1241, 1258-59 (1997).  That fear was well founded.  For example, when States 
“needed to enact legislation prohibiting British ships from entering American 
harbors” to give the Nation leverage in trade negotiations, Massachusetts passed a 
navigation act restricting foreign vessels’ use of its ports.  LeBoeuf, The Econom-
ics of Federalism and the Proper Scope of the Federal Commerce Power, 31 San 
Diego L. Rev. 555, 595-96 (1994).  But “most states did nothing,” preferring to 
take for themselves the “significant amount of trade” Massachusetts’s law diverted 
from its shores.  Id.  Massachusetts consequently repealed its legislation.  Id.   
Based on that and other experiences, the Framers understood “the necessity 
of some general and permanent system, which should at once embrace all interests, 
and, by placing the states upon firm and united ground, enable them effectually to 
assert their commercial rights.”  4 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on 
the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 254 (Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) (statement of 
Charles Pinckney).  The Constitutional Convention resolved that Congress should 
have power “to legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union, and also 
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in those to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the harmony of 
the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation.”  2 
Farrand, supra, at 21; see also 1 id. at 21 (Resolution VI of Virginia Plan). 
The Committee of Detail then prepared the draft Constitution.  As James 
Wilson—a Committee member and later the first Supreme Court Justice—
explained, the Convention delegates agreed that federal power reaches “whatever 
object of government extends in its operation or effects beyond the bounds of a 
particular state.”  2 Elliot, supra, at 399.  While that principle was “sound and 
satisfactory,” “its application to particular cases would be accompanied with much 
difficulty, because . . .  room must be allowed for great discretionary latitude of 
construction of the principle.”  Id.  “In order to lessen or remove th[at] difficulty,” 
Wilson explained, “an enumeration of particular instances[ ] in which the 
application of the principle ought to take place, has been attempted with much 
industry and care.”  Id.  The Committee thus produced a draft Constitution with 
enumerated powers, including authority to “regulate Commerce . . .  among the 
several States.”  U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 3.  But “the purpose of enumeration was 
not to displace the principle” that federal power reaches all matters with “operation 
or effects beyond the bounds of a particular state”; the purpose instead was “to 
enact it.”  Balkin, Commerce, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 11 (2010). 
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Scholars of all stripes thus agree that the commerce power must be “under-
stood in light of the collective action problems that the nation faced under the 
Articles of Confederation.”  Cooter & Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A 
General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 115, 165 (2010); see Cala-
bresi & Terrell, The Number of States and the Economics of American Federalism, 
63 Fla. L. Rev. 1, 6 (2011) (“The most compelling argument in American history 
for empowering our national government has been the need to overcome collective 
action problems.”); Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making 
of the Constitution 178 (1996); Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce 
Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 554 
(1995); Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1335 (1934). 
B. Longstanding Practice and Precedent Confirm Congress’s Broad 
Regulatory Authority Under the Commerce Clause 
Consistent with that history, the Supreme Court has long held that the Com-
merce Clause empowers Congress to address national economic problems where 
action by the individual States is ineffective or deleterious, or where concerted 
action is otherwise appropriate.  That power has proved “‘broad enough to allow 
for the expansion of the Federal Government’s role,’” Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 
1965, in view of the Nation’s increasingly interdependent economy.   
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1. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), Chief Justice Mar-
shall ruled that Congress could regulate steamboat navigation on the Hudson 
River.  Establishing a broad principle that echoed the Constitutional Convention’s 
resolutions, he explained that the commerce power extends “to all the external 
concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the States 
generally,” excluding only those concerns “completely within a particular State,” 
and “which do not affect other States.”  Id. at 195. 
While Gibbons established federal authority over the “deep streams which 
penetrate our country in every direction,” 22 U.S. at 195, railways eventually over-
took rivers as the dominant means of interstate transportation.  But “the require-
ments of the various state statutes were conflicting and difficult for the railroads to 
implement.”  McDonald, 100 Years of Safer Railroads 1, 6-7 (1993).  “[S]tate 
governments as well as some segments of the railroad industry began to urge 
Federal legislation to provide a workable set of standards.”  Id. at 7.  When rail-
roads balked at federal regulation of intrastate rates, the Supreme Court rebuffed 
their challenges.  See The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).  Even if 
intrastate shipping was not by itself under Congress’s power, Congress “unques-
tionably” could “prevent the intrastate operations of [the railroads] from being 
made a means of injury to” its regulation of interstate commerce.  Id. at 351.  In 
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doing so, Congress was entitled to “take all measures necessary or appropriate to 
that end.”  Id. at 353 (emphasis added). 
2. The Supreme Court’s path has not been unbroken.  It has at times 
barred Congress from addressing commercial problems the States could not handle 
themselves.  In Hammer v. Dagenhart, for example, the Court invalidated a federal 
prohibition on interstate movement of goods produced by child labor even though 
state efforts to prohibit child labor were undermined by competition from States 
with laxer standards.  247 U.S. 251, 273 (1918); see also Carter v. Carter Coal 
Co., 298 U.S. 238, 307-10 (1936).  But the Court has since recognized that, in our 
interdependent national economy, those “Commerce Clause cases artificially had 
constrained the authority of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.”  United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995); see NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36 (1937).  Accordingly, in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 
100 (1941), the Court repudiated Hammer and held that Congress could regulate 
manufacturing to ensure that interstate commerce would not “be made the 
instrument of [unfair and disruptive] competition” among the States “in the 
distribution of goods produced under substandard labor conditions.”  Id. at 115-17; 
see Balkin, supra, at 32. 
Time and again the Supreme Court has upheld federal legislation on similar 
grounds.  Sustaining federal unemployment-benefits legislation under Congress’s 
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taxing power, for example, the Court noted the States’ unwillingness to enact 
similar legislation “lest in laying such a toll upon their industries, they would place 
themselves in a position of economic disadvantage as compared with neighbors or 
competitors.”  Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 588 (1937).2  
A State’s beneficent actions might also unduly drain its coffers, the Court recog-
nized, because “[t]he existence of . . . a system [of old-age benefits] is a bait to the 
needy and dependent elsewhere, encouraging them to migrate and seek a haven of 
repose.  Only a power that is national can serve the interests of all.”  Helvering v. 
Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644 (1937). 
The Court similarly recognized the profound impact of intrastate matters on 
interstate commerce in upholding New Deal labor regulation, reaffirming Chief 
Justice Marshall’s observation that federal power extends “to those internal con-
cerns which affect the States generally” and excludes only matters “completely 
within a particular State” that “do not affect other States.”  Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 
195.  “Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately consid-
ered,” the Court held, “if they have such a close and substantial relation to 
interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that 
____________________________ 
2 The Court noted that Massachusetts’s unemployment-benefits act by its terms 
would “not become operative unless the federal bill became a law, or unless eleven 
of [21 listed] states should impose on their employers burdens substantially 
equivalent.”  Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 588 n.9. 
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commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to 
exercise that control.”  Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37.   
Then-Solicitor General (later Justice) Stanley Reed explained how increas-
ingly interconnected markets led to expanded exercises of federal commerce 
power:  “In a simpler time, when life ordinarily was limited to community activ-
ities, or at most to the boundaries of a single State, the powers granted to the 
national government were rarely utilized in such manner as to affect the daily 
existence of the citizen.”  Reed, The Constitution and the Problems of Today, 47 
Proc. Va. St. Bar Ass’n 277, 277 (1936).  But “[w]ith our social and economic 
development, with improvements in transportation and communication, with 
broadening boundaries and increasing population, with industrialization and multi-
plying world contacts, problems believed to require further exercise of national 
powers appeared.”  Id.  Everyone, Reed concluded, “must recognize the desira-
bility of Federal and State legislation of a new type to meet the exigencies of this 
modern world.”  Id. at 300. 
That explanation echoed the understanding that had come to pervade the 
Nation.  See, e.g., Rendezvous with Destiny: Addresses and Opinions of Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt 295 (Hardman ed., 1944) (“The prosperity of the farmer does 
have an effect today on the manufacturer in Pittsburgh.  The prosperity of the 
clothing worker in the City of New York has an effect on the prosperity of the 
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farmer in Wisconsin, and so it goes.  We are interdependent—we are tied togeth-
er.”).  The Supreme Court likewise came to recognize that, in an integrated econ-
omy, even small choices—such as a farmer’s “trivial” consumption of homegrown 
wheat—can cumulatively have sufficient repercussions throughout national mar-
kets to justify federal regulation.  Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 
(1942); see Cooter & Siegel, supra, at 160.  
3. Since then, the Supreme Court has continued to uphold Congress’s 
power to protect, promote, and regulate interstate commerce.  For example, Con-
gress may prohibit discrimination in public accommodations because such discrim-
ination restricts interstate travelers’ choices and impedes the free flow of com-
merce.  See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300 (1964); Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1964).  And Congress may 
enact environmental measures that States, deterred by the prospect of disadvan-
taging in-state businesses, might not implement themselves.  See Hodel v. Va. 
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 281-82 (1981).  
The need for national solutions has also grown as the Nation has increased 
from 13 to 50 States.  Cooter & Siegel, supra, at 143; Balkin, supra, at 12 n.37.  
“[A]s the number of members of a federation increases, the amount of regulation 
of interstate commerce and the scope of the federal government’s power over 
interstate commerce . . . increase[s] as well.”  Calabresi & Terrell, supra, at 16.  
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The exercise of federal commerce power has thus expanded in tandem with the 
economy’s growing interconnectedness as well as the increasing need for national 
solutions to problems that would otherwise be left unaddressed by individual 
States—a need the Framers well understood.   
Far from rejecting that understanding, recent Supreme Court decisions 
emphasizing the limits of Congress’s commerce powers embrace it.  In striking 
down a federal prohibition on gun possession near schools and a federal law 
addressing violence against women, the Supreme Court carefully explained that 
those provisions bore only the most “attenuated” connection to anything resem-
bling commerce, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000), and impli-
cated no barriers to effective individual state action, Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 
(Kennedy, J., concurring).  Those decisions are fully consistent with the broad 
commerce power the Court has recognized for two centuries. 
II. The Act Falls Within the Historical Understanding of Congress’s 
Commerce Powers 
A. The Act Directly Regulates Interstate Commerce 
In South-Eastern Underwriters, the Supreme Court held that “the word 
‘commerce’ as used in the Commerce Clause . . . include[s] a business such as 
insurance.”  322 U.S. at 539; see 42 U.S.C. §18091(a)(3).  Health insurance is no 
exception.  To the contrary, its interstate nature is inescapable.  “Health insurance 
and health care services” now constitute over one-sixth of the U.S. economy.  42 
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U.S.C. §18091(a)(2)(B).  And “[p]rivate health insurance spending . . . pays for 
medical supplies, drugs, and equipment that are shipped in interstate commerce.”  
Id.  “[M]ost health insurance is sold by national or regional health insurance 
companies”; “health insurance is sold in interstate commerce”; and “claims 
payments flow through interstate commerce.”  Id.   
There is thus no serious debate that almost all the Act’s provisions address-
ing health-insurance contract terms fall squarely within Congress’s commerce 
power.  Those provisions do not merely address matters that “substantially affect 
interstate commerce.”  Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005).  They directly 
regulate commercial transactions in a nationwide marketplace by regularizing the 
terms on which health insurance is offered.  Regulations governing the “practical 
aspects of the insurance companies’ methods of doing business” affect the 
“[i]nterrelationship, interdependence, and integration of activities in all the states 
in which they operate,” the “continuous and indivisible stream of intercourse 
among the states composed of collections of premiums, payments of policy 
obligations, and the countless documents and communications which are essential 
to the negotiation and execution of policy contracts.”  South-Eastern Underwriters, 
322 U.S. at 541.  The Act permissibly “prescrib[es] rules for carrying on that 
intercourse.”  Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 190. 
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The Act also regulates in an area where the States often cannot.  Most States 
allow insurance companies to deny “coverage, charge higher premiums, and/or 
refuse to cover” preexisting medical conditions.  Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
Coverage Denied 1 (2009).  As a result, many individuals cannot obtain insurance.  
Id.  Yet pioneering States seeking to guarantee coverage for preexisting conditions 
confront a grave risk of systemic failure.  Individuals whose health conditions 
make it impossible to obtain coverage in other States will be drawn to States with 
more protective laws.  That, in turn, can drive premiums up.  Healthier individuals 
may flee.  And insurers may abandon the State, leaving residents with fewer 
choices and less competition.  Indeed, after Kentucky enacted reform, all but two 
insurers (one State-run) abandoned the State.  See Kirk, Riding the Bull, 25 J. 
Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 133 (2000); Balkin, supra, at 46.  States seeking to resolve 
the problem of preexisting conditions thus face overwhelming difficulties if other 
States do not follow suit.  Only a handful of States have attempted to ban 
preexisting-condition exclusions, and only one, Massachusetts, has had anything 
approaching success.  See pp. 27-28, infra.   
The Act, moreover, prevents the “interrupt[ion]” of “the harmony of the 
United States” and impediments to interstate commerce that balkanized state 
regulation might cause.  2 Farrand, supra, at 21.  Individuals with preexisting 
medical conditions, for example, often cannot pursue opportunities in States that 
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permit insurers to deny coverage for those conditions.  Congress has sought to 
redress such unnecessary and nationally detrimental barriers to interstate migration 
and commerce in the past.  See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accounta-
bility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, tit. I, 110 Stat. 1936, 1939; id. §195(a)(1), 
110 Stat. at 1991; cf. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 300; Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 
U.S. at 252-53. 
B. The Minimum-Coverage Requirement Falls Within Congress’s 
Commerce Power 
The minimum-coverage requirement regulates commerce.  As the United 
States has explained, Americans choose how to finance their healthcare:  They can 
pre-pay for it by purchasing insurance or risk trying to pay for it on an as-needed 
basis.  Cumulatively, those individual choices have an impact on interstate com-
merce that dwarfs the decision to grow wheat for personal consumption at issue in 
Wickard.  In 2008, for example, the “cost of providing uncompensated care to the 
uninsured” totaled $43 billion.  42 U.S.C. §18091(a)(2)(F).  “[H]ealth care 
providers pass on th[at] cost to private insurers, which pass on the cost” by 
charging families higher premiums, “by on average over $1,000 a year.”  Id.  Other 
effects abound:  Doctors “curtail unprofitable services and shorten hours of ser-
vice.”  Pagán & Pauly, Community-Level Uninsurance and the Unmet Medical 
Needs of Insured and Uninsured Adults, 41 Health Serv. Res. 788, 791 (2006).  
And “lower revenue streams . . . could even force [providers and hospitals] to 
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relocate or cease” operating altogether.  Id. at 789.  Thus, as with the other, 
unchallenged provisions of the Act, “Congress had a rational basis for concluding 
that leaving [healthcare-financing decisions by the uninsured] outside federal 
control would similarly affect price and market conditions.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 19. 
Plaintiffs focus their Commerce Clause challenge almost exclusively on 
Congress’s purported inability to regulate inactivity as opposed to activity.  Pl. Br. 
50-60.  But “the relevant text of the Constitution does not contain such a 
limitation.”  Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, —  F.3d  —, 2011 WL 2556039, at 
*27 (6th Cir. June 29, 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring).  Nor does that limitation have 
any pedigree in Supreme Court precedent.  It instead harkens to formalisms long 
rejected by the Court.  As Wickard explained, “recognition of the relevance of the 
economic effects in the application of the Commerce Clause . . . has made the 
mechanical application of legal formulas no longer feasible.”  317 U.S. at 123-24.  
Rather, “interstate commerce itself is a practical conception,” and “interferences 
with that commerce must be appraised by a judgment that does not ignore actual 
experience.”  Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 41-42.  A regulated matter, 
“whatever its nature,” can “be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial 
economic effect on interstate commerce.”  Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125.  
The purported activity/inactivity distinction also makes little sense.  “Econo-
mists accept . . . that some forms of ‘inactivity’ affect economic health as much as 
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activity does.”  Mariner & Annas, Health Insurance Politics in Federal Court, 363 
New Eng. J. Med. 1300, 1301 (2010).  The Supreme Court recognized that 
principle in Wickard, holding that Congress could validly restrict “the extent . . . to 
which one may forestall resort to the market by producing [wheat] to meet his own 
needs,” even if it “forc[ed] some farmers into the market to buy what they could 
provide for themselves.”  317 U.S. at 127, 129 (emphasis added).  “Far from being 
passive and noneconomic, the uninsured consume” billions of dollars in 
uncompensated care, “the costs of which are passed through health care institutions 
to insured Americans.”  Rosenbaum & Gruber, Buying Health Care, the Individual 
Mandate, and the Constitution, 363 New Eng. J. Med. 401, 402 (2010). 
The minimum-coverage requirement, moreover, falls on the “activity” side 
of any activity/inactivity divide.  “No one is inactive when deciding how to pay for 
health care, as self-insurance and private insurance are two forms of action for 
addressing the same risk.  Each requires affirmative choices; one is no less active 
than the other; and both affect commerce.”  Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039, at 
*29 (Sutton, J., concurring).  The requirement thus regulates present “economic 
and financial decisions about how and when health care is paid for, and when 
health insurance is purchased”—whether to pay for healthcare now by buying 
insurance or to defer payment by attempting to self-insure.  42 U.S.C. 
§18091(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added).  It likewise regulates the inevitable future 
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activity of obtaining healthcare, by requiring advance arrangements that ensure an 
ability to pay for it.  Congress could certainly enact a statute requiring any indi-
vidual who obtained healthcare without payment in 2010 to purchase insurance for 
2011 or pay a penalty.  The Act simply does that without waiting for an instance of 
non-payment.3 
Plaintiffs invoke the rhetoric of personal liberty against “government 
tyranny.”  Pl. Br. 47-48, 58-60.  But the question here is not whether “other pro-
visions of the Constitution—such as the Due Process Clause”—would preclude the 
minimum-coverage requirement; the question is the scope of Congress’s commerce 
power.  Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956.  Structural aspects of the Constitution often 
protect individual liberty.  See Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364-65 
(2011).  But courts enforce those aspects by ensuring that Congress is acting within 
its enumerated powers, not by importing substantive due process concerns into its 
Commerce Clause analysis.  Plaintiffs do not frame their arguments in terms of 
substantive due process, a highly dubious theory that would put healthcare reform 
____________________________ 
3 Congress already directly regulates countless activities that affect the risk of 
requiring healthcare, from car safety, 49 U.S.C. §30101 et seq., to food content, 21 
U.S.C. §301 et seq.  Congress would not be said to regulate “inactivity” if it 
required everyone who chooses to engage in those activities—e.g., driving a car or 
buying certain foods—to obtain insurance, even though that would cover virtually 
every American.  The minimum-coverage requirement achieves the same result 
through less convoluted means. 
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beyond even state authority.4  Yet invalidating the provision would have the same 
practical effect, given most States’ inability to address the problem alone. 
No one disputes that Congress could have chosen to tax all Americans and 
spend those dollars buying insurance for each American “in aid of the ‘general 
welfare.’”  Cf. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640-42.  The minimum-coverage require-
ment is no more damaging to individual liberty.  To the contrary, it removes the 
government as purchaser and allows individuals, not bureaucrats, to choose their 
policies.  Even if some individuals might have been able to self-insure reliably, or 
to live so remotely as to preclude any resort to the healthcare system, Congress is 
not required “to legislate with scientific exactitude.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 17.  It 
may, “ ‘[w]hen it is necessary in order to prevent an evil[,] . . . make the law 
embrace more than the precise thing to be prevented.’”  Perez v. United States, 402 
U.S. 146, 154 (1971).  “When Congress decides that the ‘“total incidence”’ of a 
practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class.”  
Raich, 545 U.S. at 17.  In the aggregate, uninsured individuals seeking healthcare 
impose an enormous burden on the healthcare system that “affect[s] price and 
____________________________ 
4 The minimum-coverage requirement no more violates substantive due process 
than far more invasive regulations like compulsory vaccination laws.  See Jacob-
son v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Constitutionality of the Affordable Care 
Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (Feb. 2, 2011) 
(statement of Professor Charles Fried), http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/11-02-02% 
20Fried%20Testimony.pdf. 
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market conditions” of health insurance generally.  Id. at 19; 42 U.S.C. 
§18091(a)(2)(F); see pp. 18-20, supra.  As a result, “a ‘rational basis’ exists” for 
concluding that uninsured individuals “substantially affect interstate commerce.”  
Raich, 545 U.S. at 22. 
III. The Minimum-Coverage Requirement Is Necessary and Proper To 
Effectuate Congress’s Regulation of Health Insurance 
The minimum-coverage requirement is also independently supported by the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.  That clause at the very least allows Congress to 
enact additional provisions that are essential to the effective exercise of its 
enumerated powers.  That is precisely how the minimum-coverage requirement 
operates.  Congress unquestionably has authority under the Commerce Clause to 
prohibit, for example, discriminatory pricing and preexisting-condition exclusions.  
The minimum-coverage provision prevents adverse selection from causing those 
wholly proper regulations from collapsing.  If a provision that is critical to pro-
tecting Congress’s exercise of Commerce Clause authority from self-destruction is 
not “necessary and proper,” it is hard to imagine what could be. 
A. The Necessary and Proper Clause Grants Congress Broad Powers 
To Choose Means That Are Rationally Related to the Implemen-
tation of Its Legitimately Exercised Powers 
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution “grants Congress broad authority,” 
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956, to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution” its enumerated powers, U.S. Const. art. I, §8, 
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cl. 18.  Congress legitimately exercises that power “when the means chosen, al-
though themselves not within the granted power, [a]re nevertheless deemed 
appropriate aids” rationally related “to the accomplishment of some purpose within 
an admitted power of the national government.”  Darby, 312 U.S. at 121. 
Because the Necessary and Proper Clause “empowers Congress to enact 
laws in effectuation of its enumerated powers that are not within its authority to 
enact in isolation,” necessary-and-proper legislation in aid of Congress’s com-
merce power need not itself “regulate economic activities that substantially affect 
interstate commerce.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 37, 39 (Scalia, J., concurring in judg-
ment).  It is sufficient for such provisions to be helpful to otherwise permissible 
regulation of economic activities. 
That has been true for centuries.  In McCulloch, the Supreme Court recog-
nized that “a government, entrusted with” enumerated powers, “must also be 
entrusted with ample means for their execution.”  17 U.S. at 408.  “[N]ecessary,” 
Chief Justice Marshall explained, does not mean “absolutely necessary.”  Id. at 
414-15; see also 3 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 
§1243, at 118 (1833); id. §1240, at 116.  Instead, “the Necessary and Proper 
Clause makes clear that the Constitution’s grants of specific federal legislative 
authority are accompanied by broad power to enact laws that are ‘convenient, or 
useful’ or ‘conducive’ to the authority’s ‘beneficial exercise.’”  Comstock, 130 S. 
Appellate Case: 11-1973     Page: 31      Date Filed: 08/19/2011 Entry ID: 3820021
  25
Ct. at 1956 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 413, 418).  The Necessary and Proper 
Clause sweeps broadly because the Constitution is “intended to endure for ages to 
come, and, consequently [is] to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”  
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 415; see id. at 421. 
McCulloch was not written on a blank slate.  Hamilton and Madison had 
sparred over the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause as they debated the 
constitutionality of the Bank of the United States.  To Hamilton, the proper focus 
was on “the end to which the measure relates as a mean.”  Legislative and Docu-
mentary History of the Bank of the United States 99 (Clark & Hall eds., 1832).  “If 
the end be clearly comprehended within any of the specified powers, and if the 
measure have an obvious relation to that end, and is not forbidden by any particular 
provision of the constitution, it may safely be deemed to come within the compass 
of the national authority.”  Id.  Madison took a narrower view, interpreting the 
clause as endowing Congress with power only to provide a “direct and incidental 
means” to support the exercise of an enumerated power.  Id. at 42.  In the end, 
Hamilton prevailed:  “The interpretation given by Mr. Hamilton was substantially 
followed by Chief Justice Marshall, in McCulloch . . . .”  The Legal Tender Cases, 
79 U.S. 457, 642 (1870) (Chase, C.J., dissenting).  But the minimum-coverage 
provision survives even under Madison’s more limited interpretation. 
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B. The Minimum-Coverage Requirement Comfortably Falls Within 
Congress’s Necessary-and-Proper Authority 
To be valid under the Necessary and Proper Clause, a statute need only 
“constitute[ ] a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitu-
tionally enumerated power.”  Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956.  “ ‘If it can be seen that 
the means adopted are really calculated to attain the end, the degree of their 
necessity, the extent to which they conduce to the end, the closeness of the 
relationship between the means adopted and the end to be attained, are matters for 
congressional determination alone.’”  Id. at 1957.  The minimum-coverage re-
quirement fits comfortably within that authority.   
1. There is no dispute that Congress legitimately exercised its Commerce 
Clause authority when it enacted provisions preventing insurers from imposing 
preexisting-condition exclusions, 42 U.S.C. §300gg-3(a), or health-status restric-
tions, id. §300gg-4(a).  See p. 16, supra.  The minimum-coverage requirement is a 
necessary and proper means of ensuring that those provisions do not collapse under 
the weight of a massive adverse-selection problem. 
Absent the minimum-coverage requirement, the prohibition on exclusions 
for preexisting conditions could encourage individuals not to buy insurance until 
they have a condition needing coverage.  “[I]f there were no requirement” that in-
dividuals maintain insurance, Congress observed, “many individuals”—particu-
larly healthy individuals—“would wait to purchase health insurance until they 
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needed care,” 42 U.S.C. §18091(a)(2)(I), secure in the knowledge that coverage 
could not later be denied if they become ill.  Insurance markets would become 
dominated by high-cost, high-risk individuals in need of immediate care.  Premi-
ums would skyrocket, defeating the very objectives Congress sought to achieve—
making insurance more widely and readily available to the American public. 
Congress concluded that the appropriate means of preventing that adverse-
selection problem, and protecting the Act’s guarantee of coverage for preexisting 
conditions and similar provisions, was to require all qualified individuals (healthy 
and unhealthy alike) to participate by obtaining insurance.  42 U.S.C. 
§18091(a)(2)(I).  The minimum-coverage requirement, Congress thus found, is 
“essential to creating effective health insurance markets in which improved health 
insurance products that are guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of 
preexisting conditions can be sold.”  Id. 
That “ ‘judgment of Congress,’” Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1957, is not merely 
entitled to judicial respect.  It is based on unassailable economics.  Absent a man-
date, adverse selection drives up premiums.  See Glied et al., Consider It Done? 
The Likely Efficacy of Mandates for Health Insurance, 26 Health Aff. 1612, 1613 
(2007).  Indeed, “[f]ive states have tried to undertake reforms . . . without enacting 
an individual mandate; those five states are now among the eight states with the 
most expensive nongroup health insurance.”  Rosenbaum & Gruber, supra, at 403.  
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In Washington and Kentucky, insurers fled the market.  Kirk, supra, at 139, 152.  
By contrast, when Massachusetts coupled its limit on preexisting-condition 
exclusions with an individual mandate, that somewhat ameliorated the adverse-
selection problem.  Chandra, et al., The Importance of the Individual Mandate—
Evidence from Massachusetts, 364 New Eng. J. Med. 293, 295 (2011).  To be 
necessary and proper, a provision need only “constitute[ ] a means that is rationally 
related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.”  Comstock, 
130 S. Ct. at 1956.  Here, the minimum-coverage requirement is not merely 
“rationally related” to Congress’s regulation of the terms of insurance under its 
Commerce Clause authority.  It is critical to Congress’s exercise of that authority.   
2. Rather than addressing whether the minimum-coverage requirement is 
rationally related to Congress’s exercise of its commerce powers, plaintiffs argue 
that the requirement cannot be sustained under the Necessary and Proper Clause 
because that provision should not allow Congress to legislate beyond an enu-
merated power.  Pl. Br. 61-63.  That view cannot be reconciled with the Supreme 
Court’s recognition that the clause does allow Congress to “enact laws in 
effectuation of its enumerated powers that are not within its authority to enact in 
isolation.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); see Com-
stock, 130 S. Ct. at 1957-58; Darby, 312 U.S. at 121.  It is also contrary to cen-
turies of precedent.  Under McCulloch, a provision need only be “convenient, or 
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useful” or “conducive” to Congress’s exercise of an enumerated power, 17 U.S. at 
413, 418, a standard the minimum-coverage requirement comfortably meets.  
Indeed, the requirement satisfies any conceivable interpretation of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.  The requirement survives review whether one requires “a 
tangible link to commerce,” Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1967 (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in judgment), an “ ‘appropriate’ link between a power conferred by the Constitu-
tion and the law enacted by Congress,” id. at 1970 (Alito, J., concurring in 
judgment), an “ ‘“obvious, simple, and direct relation”’ to an exercise of Congress’ 
enumerated powers,” id. at 1975 n.7 (Thomas, J., dissenting), or, as Madison 
thought, a “direct and incidental” connection to a constitutional end, Clark & Hall, 
supra, at 42.  Quite simply, the minimum-coverage requirement is directly nec-
essary to the efficacy of a comprehensive regulatory scheme otherwise within 
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.  See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.   
Indeed, while the Supreme Court has rejected the claim that “Necessary and 
Proper” legislation “can be no more than one step removed from a specifically 
enumerated power,” Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1963 (emphasis added); see also id. at 
1965-66 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment), the minimum-coverage require-
ment would meet even that test.  It is only one step removed because, without it, 
many of the Act’s direct regulations of insurance terms in interstate commerce 
would crater.  See pp. 26-28, supra.  While courts should not “‘pile inference upon 
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inference’” to sustain congressional action under the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1963; see also Raich, 545 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring 
in judgment), no inference-piling is needed here.  Experience has shown that the 
non-discrimination requirements and the prohibition against preexisting-condition 
exclusions—both proper exercises of core Commerce Clause powers—could not 
function effectively absent a requirement that everyone (healthy and unhealthy 
alike) be insured.  In short, it is not “merely possible for a court to think of a 
rational basis on which Congress might have perceived an attenuated link between 
the powers underlying the [Act’s health-insurance regulations] and the challenged 
[minimum-coverage] provision.”  Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1970 (Alito, J., con-
curring in judgment).  The “substantial link to Congress’ constitutional powers” is 
readily apparent.  Id. 
3. The Necessary and Proper Clause also obviates any activity/inactivity 
distinction.  “[W]here Congress has the authority to enact a regulation of interstate 
commerce, ‘it possesses every power needed to make that regulation effective.’”  
Raich, 545 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis added).  Even 
if plaintiffs’ activity/inactivity distinction had any merit in the Commerce Clause 
context—and it does not—there is no room in the Necessary and Proper Clause for 
artificial distinctions between compelling and prohibiting conduct. 
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History makes clear that individual mandates are accepted, “necessary and 
proper” means of effectuating enumerated powers.  In the Republic’s earliest days, 
Congress discharged its authority to “provide for organizing, arming, and disci-
plining, the Militia,” U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 16, by compelling activity:  It 
mandated militiamen to obtain particular arms and supplies.  See, e.g., Act of May 
8, 1792, ch. 33, §1, 1 Stat. 271, 271 (persons liable for service must provide “a 
good musket or firelock, a sufficient bayonet and belt, two spare flints,” and 
ammunition); id. §4, 1 Stat. at 272-73 (horses and uniforms).  Congress has also 
prohibited inactivity by requiring people to respond to the census, 13 U.S.C. 
§221(a)-(b), report for jury duty, 28 U.S.C. §1866(g), and register for selective 
service, 50 App. U.S.C. §453.  Congress thus has a long history of compelling 
conduct in service of other enumerated powers.  The Commerce Clause—one of 
Congress’s broadest powers—should not be viewed any differently.   
CONCLUSION 
If the Court reaches the merits, it should order judgment for the defendants. 
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